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 Two key concepts in alliance theory that remain ever relevant in practice today are those of abandonment and entrapment. In short, whenever there is an 
expectation of a military commitment, whether formal or informal, there may 
be two accompanying fears. The first is that the ally will fail to meet its end of 
the bargain—that it will abandon its obligations in a time of need. The second 
fear is that a security commitment will draw an ally into a war it did not want 
to fight; that is, it will be entrapped in conflict. These fears of abandonment and 
entrapment influence alliance interactions, although their impacts on security 
relationships are the source of debate among practitioners and academics alike.
These concepts, as employed in international relations studies, emerged in 
the late Cold War era against the backdrop of bipolar superpower competition.1 
Certainly, things have changed since the Cold War, 
both in practice and in academic understanding. 
A wealth of studies have been performed within 
the field of foederology; much of that work centers 
on the notions of abandonment and entrapment.2 
There also have been significant changes to the 
strategic environment; the prevalence of interstate 
and extrastate warfare involving alliance com-
mitments has decreased, and security conflict 
among states has expanded into new domains, 
with greater emphasis on the application of non-
military instruments of power.3 This has created 
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an increased need for a “whole-of-government” approach to security issues that 
goes beyond traditional defense sectors. At the same time, the nature and role of 
alliances within competition and conflict have evolved.
From this, two problems emerge associated with collective understandings of 
abandonment and entrapment. The first is the absence of a compilation of key 
takeaways from scholarship, especially those that apply the two concepts to the 
present security environment. But scholars have tested and refined the theories 
surrounding the fears and risks of abandonment and entrapment, to a degree 
sufficient to warrant an update to our understanding of what they, taken in 
aggregate, mean for alliances in the present day.
The second problem is the gap between scholars and practitioners in un-
derstanding abandonment and entrapment. Academia offers much toward 
comprehending those issues, but applying existing scholarship is difficult, given 
the absence of a study that connects it to the current strategic environment in a 
practical manner. There must be a way to compile existing scholarship in a way 
that is useful to practitioners.
This article seeks to remedy those problems by answering the question of 
how abandonment and entrapment can affect alliance management in a modern 
strategic environment marked by gray-zone conflict. To accomplish this, it first 
defines alliances and explains how they function in response to security incidents 
that may warrant allied response. Next the article curates notable takeaways from 
the wealth of scholarship on abandonment and entrapment. Then the article ex-
plains some of the defining characteristics of the modern security environment—
specifically, the type of security incidents that affect formal alliances. From there, 
it applies the aggregated theoretical takeaways to the U.S.-Japan alliance to yield 
better understanding of how abandonment and entrapment influence alliance 
interactions.
This examination is important for academics and practitioners alike. It 
aggregates seven key takeaways from existing literature on the concepts of 
abandonment and entrapment. The article also posits that in the age of gray-zone 
conflict adversaries can undermine alliance relationships without reaching the 
threshold to trigger an alliance response. It further highlights that the influences 
on traditional military alliances of diplomatic, information, and economic 
instruments of power have increased. Those factors reveal that although alliances 
formed in the Cold War era have succeeded in deterring interstate military 
disputes, adversaries are seeking means of changing the status quo through 
security incidents short of an armed attack. This means that designs predicated 
on response to armed attack and focused primarily on military guarantees must 
be adapted to meet the needs of the modern strategic environment. There are 
examples of how alliances are adapting, and this article offers one in the form 
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of the U.S.-Japan alliance and its employment of the negotiated “Guidelines for 
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” to prepare seamless responses to gray-zone 
threats.4 
There are limits to this examination. First, the article focuses on formal alli-
ances that contain an obligation for the use of military force in support of one or 
more parties to a security relationship. In other words, the focus is on alliances 
codified by an international treaty that includes a military guarantee. This is 
necessary for a couple of reasons. Treaty alliances are recognized under interna-
tional law, so decision-making related to those formal instruments has important 
institutional and reputational impacts.5 It will be important for future studies to 
examine alignments as opposed to alliances, but that is not the aim of this article.6 
Also, the fears and risks of abandonment and entrapment are not uniformly ap-
plicable across neutrality, nonaggression, and consultation pacts as well, even 
though some alliance scholars prefer to include those types in their examinations 
of alliance reliability.
The second boundary is that this article focuses only on the present security 
environment. While some conclusions detailed here feasibly could apply to other 
eras of conflict, the article makes no claims of universal applicability.
Finally, the case study focuses on a bilateral alliance to minimize variables in 
understanding how the fears of abandonment and entrapment operate within an 
alliance relationship. However, the arguments made here open the door to apply-
ing them in future examinations of multilateral alliances.
DEFINING ALLIANCES AND HOW THEY FUNCTION IN PRACTICE
To understand abandonment and entrapment from a practical perspective, one 
first must define an alliance clearly, since scholars and practitioners alike disagree 
on the subject. For the sake of clarity, this article focuses on treaty alliances that 
contain a formal obligation for the use of military force in support of one or 
more allies. This use of force occurs when a certain threshold is met—the casus 
foederis.
In many alliances, some rights and obligations apply even in the absence of 
security conflict. This article refers to these as peacetime trade-offs. Such trade-
offs may include basing rights, security assistance, intelligence sharing, peacetime 
military training, and transfer of defense technology. They are privileges and 
obligations that distinguish allies from nonallies, even in the absence of conflict.
Still, at the core of any alliance are the casus foederis and the obligation for one 
or more allies to use military force in support of another. The obligation kicks in 
to use military force or to provide certain exceptional rights and privileges for 
the purpose of responding to military conflict following a security incident. A 
security incident is any event that has the potential for triggering the casus foederis 
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(i.e., when the threshold for alliance response is reached). The incident can be 
offensive or defensive in nature, meaning an ally can initiate it (such as by car-
rying out a preemptive strike against an adversary) or it can be reactive (such as 
responding to an armed attack against an ally).
This is the point at which the potential for abandonment or entrapment comes 
into play. The state involved in the security incident must decide whether to 
invoke alliance obligations, and the ally (or allies) then must decide whether to 
answer the call. If the state involved in the security incident decides not to invoke 
the casus foederis, the alliance continues with normal peacetime trade-offs. If 
the state does invoke it, there are four potential outcomes. First, an ally could 
recognize the validity of the casus foederis but choose not to meet its obligations. 
This constitutes abandonment. Second, the ally could argue that the security 
incident does not meet the threshold for alliance response, and elect not to meet 
the obligations expected. This is more nuanced, but ultimately represents a form 
of abandonment, at least in the eyes of the ally invoking the casus foederis. Third, 
the ally could engage in a conflict it does not want to fight, which would constitute 
a form of entrapment.7 Fourth, the ally could answer the call unreservedly.
There are two takeaways from this. First, the casus foederis is important from a 
practical perspective, because it is what a state uses to prompt its allies to provide 
obligations that go beyond peacetime trade-offs. Second, there is no such thing as 
an ironclad alliance guarantee or an automatic alliance response; there are always 
the questions whether the casus foederis should be invoked and whether an ally 
should answer the call.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM SCHOLARSHIP
Beginning in earnest in the 1980s and continuing since then, scholars have been 
trying to define how the fears of abandonment and entrapment shape alliance 
politics. This article summarizes relevant alliance literature from the intervening 
decades and curates conclusions with a practical view in mind. There are seven 
key takeaways.
1. Alliances tend to deter militarized interstate conflict. Scholars have 
demonstrated that the formation of alliances contributes to a decreased 
likelihood of military conflict among states, for various reasons.8 Not 
only does this bear on the risk of entrapment, but it highlights an issue 
for present-day security. Naturally, a decreased risk of military conflict 
means less risk of becoming involved in war. However, it does not mean 
that security competition among states ceases altogether, so in the context 
of the modern strategic environment it suggests that adversaries will 
compete in other ways and using instruments of power that do not result 
in open military conflict.
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2. Risk of entrapment is low. Although some academics and practitioners 
still support the notion that entrapment is a major risk for allies, newer 
research compellingly argues that entrapment is a narrower concept than 
previously discussed and not as prevalent as once thought.9 The narrow 
scope of entrapment and the fact that states design alliances to minimize 
the risk of entrapment mean that the possibility of being pulled into a 
conflict that a state did not want to fight in the first place is low. In the 
context of the modern strategic environment, this means that, while fear 
of entrapment still impacts alliance politics, it often is inflated, and the 
problem typically lies in the irrationality of one or more leaders within the 
alliance-management framework.
3. Alliance designs matter in managing the risks of abandonment and 
entrapment. States that enter formal alliances negotiate treaties in ways 
that seek to maximize their interests while minimizing their costs. As part 
of minimizing costs, leaders anticipate the possibility of entrapment and 
carefully design alliance agreements accordingly, or they avoid entering 
into alliances in the first place.10 The explicitness of the designs and the 
language employed in alliance agreements help clarify arrangements and 
thereby reduce the risk of abandonment and entrapment.11 Additionally, 
alliance literature demonstrates that a state can leverage alliance designs 
to influence its partner’s behavior. Those designs can be employed in 
shaping the direction of a state’s military buildup, can influence foreign 
policy decisions, and can be used in restraining potentially risky behavior, 
among other things.12 The important point here is that alliance designs 
matter significantly in managing abandonment and entrapment, which 
means that alteration of those alliance designs can be an active tool in 
alliance management for influencing those risks.
4. Alliance designs include nonmilitary benefits that factor into abandonment 
and entrapment issues. In some alliances, a state cedes autonomy to a 
militarily superior ally or allies—a key trade-off, especially in asymmetric 
alliances in which only one member offers a guarantee for the use of 
military force.13 Other trade-offs may include the provision of bases, 
cost sharing (for the stationing of foreign forces), economic concessions, 
public support for the ally’s policies, and coordination of foreign policy.14 
The presence of nonmilitary benefits means that abandonment may not 
be an issue of a failure to employ military force against an adversary; 
rather, it simply may be a failure to provide some contribution that 
is necessary for a state to achieve its security objectives following a 
triggering of the casus foederis. Regarding entrapment, the provision of 
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nonmilitary objects still may present a risk of being drawn into conflict, 
the most obvious example being provision of bases for an ally’s military 
forces.15 What this means for scholars and practitioners is that one 
cannot overlook the risk of abandonment of nonmilitary contributions, 
as well as the entrapment risk that is associated with provision of those 
contributions. It also suggests that competition short of armed conflict 
increases the importance of nonmilitary aspects of alliance rights and 
obligations.
5. Risk of abandonment increases over time because alliance treaties remain 
static, while other factors do not. Scholars have established that changes 
in political administrations, age structures, and threats, among other 
factors, all can affect alliance reliability.16 The simple fact is that an 
alliance agreement, unless renegotiated or clarified through implementing 
instruments, is static, while other variables are dynamic. Over time, this 
could introduce gaps where alliance designs fail to meet particular threats 
or where new expectations emerge that are not codified formally within 
agreed-upon obligations.17 What this means for the present strategic 
environment is that alliances that are not updated, through either 
renegotiation of the treaty or the provision of clarifying instruments, may 
be outmoded. Allies who fail to manage their core arrangements could be 
unwittingly allowing the risk of abandonment to grow.
6. Adversaries attempt to undermine alliances, divide allies, or both. Existing 
literature demonstrates that even as allies seek to manage the risks of 
abandonment and entrapment, adversaries seek to undermine or break 
up alliance relationships.18 In other words, adversaries actively work to 
increase the risk of abandonment. They have attempted to exploit seams 
in alliances and will continue to do so, especially in ways that lead to 
ineffectual responses to security incidents.
7. Allies can take steps to reduce risks of abandonment and entrapment. Since 
alliance designs can manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment, 
since allies have the ability to influence partners through those designs, 
and since circumstances change over time, there are steps allies can 
take to reduce abandonment and entrapment risks. In the context of the 
present strategic environment, allies can seek to alter alliance designs to 
reduce risks of abandonment and entrapment. Allies then can leverage 
those designs in attempting to influence their allies’ behavior. They can 
do this through renegotiation of the alliance treaty or the creation of 
clarifying instruments.
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
 B O S AC K  5 1
ALLIANCES IN THE MODERN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
This section characterizes the modern strategic environment in the context of 
security alliances that incorporate both peacetime trade-offs and obligations 
that follow invocation of the casus foederis. As previously noted, alliances tend 
to deter militarized disputes, but they do not eliminate security competition 
altogether. States seeking to change the status quo simply have looked for 
methods to achieve their goals without overtly violating international law and 
thereby prompting responses from the international community, especially by 
allies of the offended state.19 In circumventing international law, some states have 
sought to act in new domains to achieve their interests, especially the cyberspace 
domain.20 They also use nonmilitary instruments of power.21 This has made Cold 
War–era alliance designs outmoded, since those were predicated on a military 
response to an armed attack in conventional domains of conflict (land, air, and 
sea). Outmoded alliance designs create seams within security relationships that 
adversaries actively seek to exploit. Fortunately, there are ways allies can adapt.
The current liberal international order is predicated on the United Nations 
system, which built on customary international law and institutions and reshaped 
many of the rules of interaction among states.22 The central tenet related to secu-
rity and defense is found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, specifically article 51, 
which states as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”23 In principle, postwar 
alliance agreements are founded on this definition of conflict, in which the secu-
rity guarantees inherent in those alliances are based on “collective self-defence” 
to be exercised in the event of an “armed attack.”24
What is an armed attack? The UN Charter does not offer a clearer explanation, 
but the 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in Nicaragua v. United 
States does.25 Stated plainly, the court held that an armed attack is an armed 
incursion into another state’s sovereign territory attributable to a specific member 
of the international community. It further clarified that, even in the event of an 
armed-attack situation, a UN member state is not permitted to exercise collective 
self-defense until the state under attack has declared the occurrence of an armed 
attack and has requested support.
Thus, an armed-attack situation is the threshold for collective self-defense 
under international law and it fulfills the casus foederis for many alliance relation-
ships; however, there are many types of security incidents that may occur prior 
to an armed attack. Some of these are depicted in the figure, arranged by level of 
intensity and impetus for response.26
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Violations of domestic interpretation of international law are incidents that 
a state may view as legal violations but that do not necessarily comport with 
internationally accepted legal interpretations. For example, Japan recognizes 
only five of its maritime straits as constituting international passages, whereas 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) maintains that any strait 
can be navigated under the right of innocent passage.27 If Japan were to respond 
militarily to the transit of Chinese naval vessels through a strait that it does not 
recognize as an international passage, this action would be based on a domes-
tic interpretation of international law, and therefore would not necessarily fall 
within the scope of alliance agreements.
Violations of international law or sanctioned activities may include situations 
such as illegal arms transfers, piracy, and state sponsorship of terrorist 
organizations.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)–related activities are any that involve 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Examples include North Korean 
nuclear testing and the illicit transfer of WMD assets and technologies.
Incidents with impact to sovereign territory but dealing no damage to personnel 





Impact to Sovereign Territory
(damage to personnel or property)
Impact to Sovereign Territory (no damage 
to personnel or property)
WMD-Related Activity
Violation of International Law / Sanctioned Activity
Violation of Domestic Interpretation of International Law
SECURITY INCIDENTS, FROM PEACETIME TO “ARMED ATTACK”
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nonmilitary personnel landing on an uninhabited island) or a failed missile test 
from which debris lands in an empty field.
Security incidents with impact to sovereign territory that includes damage 
to personnel or property represent the next level of intensity. In the missile-test 
example, debris from a failed missile might fall on a housing area or in a com-
mercial zone. Another relevant example is a cyber attack that disrupts a state’s 
critical infrastructure.
The next level up includes any of those incidents that result in loss of life.
All those security incidents could occur before reaching the level of an armed 
attack—the traditional casus foederis and international legal threshold for in-
dividual and collective self-defense. The space where security incidents occur 
before an armed attack often is referred to as the gray zone.
Two types of gray-zone conflict have become prevalent in the present security 
environment: lawfare and hybrid warfare. Lawfare is the “strategy of using—or 
misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an op-
erational objective.”28 In other words, it is the misuse of customary international 
law and UN-sponsored judicial systems to achieve strategic military or political 
ends. An example is Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea. Even 
though international tribunals have sided with other countries (e.g., the arbitral 
tribunal’s 2016 ruling in Philippines v. China), China has managed to expand its 
foothold by constructing man-made islands and conducting coercive engage-
ments in the region.29
Hybrid warfare is the “synchronized use of multiple instruments of power 
tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions 
to achieve synergistic effects.”30 A key feature of hybrid warfare is that it often is 
nonattributable, thereby avoiding international legal thresholds for any broad 
response involving the use of military force.31 Russia provides the best example 
of this threat, with its employment of cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, 
“volunteer” military forces, and other activities, all of which contributed to the 
annexation of Crimea and pose an ever-present threat to NATO allies.32
Through gray-zone conflict, an adversary can challenge the status quo without 
reaching the level of an armed attack, meaning that there is no clear impetus for 
the use of military force for individual or collective self-defense in response. Yet 
security incidents that contribute to changes in the status quo are likely to war-
rant expectations for response from a state and its allies.33
This tells us three things. First, traditional alliance relationships focused 
solely on military trade-offs are inadequate for meeting contemporary security 
challenges. Certainly, militaries are the principal actors in the execution of war, 
but what about when conventional interstate warfare no longer is the primary 
form of interstate security conflict in the world, as is the case today? Given the 
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costs associated with militarized disputes, adversaries have incentives to employ 
alternative instruments of power in their attempts to further their interests. Thus 
it is no longer practical to treat alliances as principally military in nature, because 
doing so privileges military responses, perhaps leaving other options for security 
arrangements and activities unexplored or ignored.
Second, legal foundations that have not been updated to address evolving 
security challenges create seams between allies. Conventional security guarantees 
are predicated on the notion of interstate defense. When the term defense is not 
clarified in formal or informal agreements, its definition defaults to customary 
international law (as represented in the UN Charter and the ICJ ruling, as detailed 
earlier). This does not prevent a state from acting in support of an ally without 
an armed-attack declaration, but the absence of an armed-attack situation creates 
ambiguity that increases the risk of abandonment within alliance relationships.
Third, adversaries can exploit those seams. Through lawfare and hybrid 
warfare, adversaries can take actions up to but not exceeding the threshold of 
an armed attack without triggering an alliance response.34 Since adversaries can 
“make plays” in the gray zone, security relationships that have not been updated 
to provide strategic and operational clarity are exploitable, and again the risk of 
abandonment increases.
Fortunately, there are ways for allies to adapt. As the literature survey high-
lighted, alliance designs have a profound effect on the risks of abandonment and 
entrapment, meaning that instruments that update, amend, or clarify alliance 
designs are likely to help eliminate seams in security relationships. Two key fea-
tures of these instruments should be formality and publication, since those have 
institutional and reputational effects while signaling commitments to potential 
adversaries.35
Given this, the simplest solution is renegotiation of the alliance treaty itself. 
However, since treaty language typically is vague and not directed at specific 
adversaries or security situations, a more practical solution is the creation or 
renegotiation of clarifying instruments under the alliance treaty. Clarifying 
instruments include exchanges of notes, agreements, memorandums, and other 
formally negotiated documents. A variety of informal means of clarification, 
such as joint statements, also exist, but those lack the institutional or reputational 
checks that negotiated instruments provide.
CASE STUDY: THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The U.S.-Japan alliance offers a prime case study for the consideration of 
abandonment and entrapment. It is bilateral, meaning that there are only two 
parties to the alliance agreement, which eliminates variables present in the case 
of multilateral alliances. The alliance was formed in the Cold War era, meaning 
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the treaty explicitly calls for response to an “armed attack,” with a focus on 
military guarantees. Further, it is an operative alliance, meaning the rights and 
obligations are still meaningfully in play today.36 The alliance is asymmetric, in 
that one ally—in this case, Japan—receives a security guarantee, while the other 
receives separate, nonmilitary benefits in return.37 Most importantly, there are 
clear examples of the occurrence of abandonment and entrapment fears, as well 
as an instance in which the allies responded to them.
The fears of abandonment and entrapment weighed heavily on alliance man-
agement for the United States and Japan in the early 2010s. In two scenarios in 
particular those fears affected alliance politics: the Korean Peninsula crisis and 
the defense of the Senkaku Islands.
The Korean Peninsula Crisis
The 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis and the missile launches of the late 
1990s reawakened the U.S.-Japan alliance to the threat the Kim regime posed.38 
For Japan, the fear of entrapment was no theoretical matter. The United States 
already had used Japan as a rear-support base of operations during the Korean 
War; that involvement had contributed to Japan’s desire for inclusion of a “prior 
consultation” requirement in the renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty in 
1960.39 Since then, the North Koreans have demonstrated missile technology 
capable of reaching Japanese territory.40 With a demonstrated threat from North 
Korea that included the potential for Japan to be drawn into a conflict on the 
Korean Peninsula with nuclear consequences, the preexisting fear of entrapment 
was renewed.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government had fears on the opposite end of the spectrum, 
worrying that Japan might abandon its treaty obligations in the event of a crisis or 
contingency on the Korean Peninsula. The Japanese government gave U.S. officials 
cause for concern in 2010 following the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and the shelling 
of Yeonpyeong-do.41 In each of those situations, personnel from Headquarters, 
U.S. Forces, Japan requested activation of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism 
(BCM), but each time they were rebuffed because there had been no political 
declaration of a Nihon Shūen Jitai (situation in area surrounding Japan, or SIASJ).42 
Without activation of the BCM, U.S. officials were skeptical that they could garner 
the necessary Japanese interagency support for U.S. operations in response to those 
security incidents, should de-escalation efforts fail.43
The Japanese government further reinforced this concern with its treatment 
of the “prior consultation” requirement. There long had been a debate within 
the U.S. government regarding whether the requirement simply meant 
“consultation” or it implied that “consent” from the Japanese government was 
necessary.44 During a parliamentary committee meeting on 15 July 2014, Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe offered his government’s position on the matter, stating that 
11
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Okinawa-based U.S. Marines would not deploy to support Korean contingency 
operations without Japanese government consent.45 This served as a strong signal 
to the United States that it might not receive the level of support it had expected 
in responding to security situations on the Korean Peninsula.
If not guaranteed military support, what sort of assistance does the United 
States expect? The Mutual Security Treaty and its associated status of forces 
agreement legally afford the U.S. government access to all Japanese air- and 
seaports and permit free transit through and across Japanese territory.46 There 
also are arrangements for the support of logistical, medical, and billeting needs 
for military personnel, civilian officials, and noncombatants; the list goes on. 
However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense do 
not have purview over civilian authorities or organizations. Therefore, execution 
of alliance obligations following those security incidents would have required 
interagency coordination and exceptional authorization from the Japanese 
cabinet in the context of a SIASJ—something the Japanese government was not 
prepared to perform in 2010.
Defense of the Senkaku Islands
The Senkaku Islands are a group of small, uninhabited land features located 
along the first island chain, and are the focus of territorial disputes among Japan, 
China, and Taiwan. The Senkakus have been under Japanese administration 
since U.S. reversion of the Ryukyu Islands in 1972, but China and Taiwan both 
have laid sovereignty claims to the islands.47 While Japan has worked out and 
maintained exceptional fishing agreements with Taiwan for activity in the waters 
surrounding the islands, the PRC’s China Coast Guard (CCG), fishing, and 
(occasionally) military vessels have operated in the vicinity of the islands for 
years, especially following the Japanese government’s purchase of the Senkakus 
from private Japanese landowners in 2012.48
When the Japanese government nationalized the Senkakus and tensions grew, 
it introduced fears of both abandonment and entrapment within the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. For Japan, there was a fear that the United States would not respond if 
the Chinese seized the islands by force. For the United States, the fear was that 
explicit security guarantees would increase Japanese adventurism; that is, Japan 
would be more emboldened in its responses to Chinese activity in the vicinity of 
the Senkakus, which might drag the United States into a war with China.
But the issue was even more nuanced than those basic fears might suggest. 
The question emerged of what would happen if a paramilitary group landed on 
the islands.49 If Japan could not declare an armed-attack situation, what authority 
would the U.S. military have to provide collective self-defense in support of its 
ally? What if there were a clash between coast guards, not militaries? Would the 
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U.S. Navy have any authority to get involved if the dispute were between law-
enforcement entities? What if the CCG vessel capabilities were equivalent to 
those of naval forces?50
While some dispute the nature of Chinese intentions in the East China Sea, the 
Japanese government’s assessment is clear.51 Chinese activity in the vicinity of the 
Senkakus aims to create a situation of “coadministration” rather than Japanese 
sole administration of the islands and their surrounding waters. From there, 
China could make a play for sole administration. The Chinese use of gray-zone 
tactics around the Senkakus is a clear example of seeking to change the status quo 
without triggering a militarized dispute under international law, and gray-zone 
tactics that fail to trigger the casus foederis increase the risk of abandonment.
The Alliance Response: The “2015 Guidelines”
After and while dealing with this pair of scenarios, the two allies in question 
addressed their fears of abandonment and entrapment, and pursued other goals, 
through renegotiation of the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” 
The guidelines are a bilaterally agreed-upon framework of alliance roles, 
missions, and capabilities (RMCs). They are not a direct supplement to the 
existing alliance treaty; instead, the guidelines exist as a separate implementation 
framework dependent on each nation’s own laws. There have been only three 
versions of the guidelines in the nearly seventy-year history of the alliance, those 
of 1978, 1997, and 2015.
More than simply providing a road map for cooperation, the guidelines rep-
resent a de facto clarification of the casus foederis. They reorient the alliance for 
different threats, clarify core values, and manage expectations for when and how 
the allies will apply their respective capabilities in response to both peacetime 
conditions and security situations.52 In places the content of the guidelines is aspi-
rational; in others it serves as a starting point for the allies to initiate a new RMC; 
in still others it formalizes initiatives already under way. Whatever the case, once 
published the guidelines provide a constant point of reference for the allies, as 
illustrated by the repeated references to them in joint statements at all levels of 
alliance management, but most notably by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative 
Committee.53
The “2015 Guidelines” dealt with the fears of entrapment and abandonment 
in the following four ways. First, the document explicitly defined the role of 
the alliance in all situations, from peacetime through armed attack. For the 
allies, an armed-attack situation is the explicit casus foederis under article 5 of 
the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation.54 With the “2015 
Guidelines,” the allies formally broadened the casus foederis to include gray-
zone threats as well, calling for “seamless responses,” highlighting the need for 
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whole-of-government approaches to security issues, and identifying categories of 
security incidents that require alliance response.55 Those categories of cooperation 
include “Cooperative Measures from Peacetime,” “Responses to Emerging 
Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security,” “Action in Response to an Armed Attack 
against Japan,” “Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country Other 
Than Japan,” “Cooperation in Response to Large-Scale Disaster in Japan,” and 
“Cooperation in International Activities.”56
Second, the guidelines called for establishment of the Alliance Coordination 
Mechanism (ACM).57 There are three reasons the U.S.-Japan alliance requires a 
coordination mechanism. The first is the necessity to manage policy decisions that 
affect the alliance in times of crisis or contingency.58 The second is the operational 
coordination that must occur among separate organizations, given the alliance’s 
bilateral structure, as opposed to a combined-forces structure.59 The third rea-
son—which is not stated explicitly, but lies at the core of the purpose for the co-
ordination mechanism—is to manage the risks of abandonment and entrapment.
The Mutual Security Treaty establishes specific rights and obligations, and the 
ACM helps ensure that the allies honor their commitments. For example, if there 
were to be a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. government would use the 
ACM to provide the entire Japanese interagency structure with the information 
and requests for support needed to be able to ensure provision of necessary ac-
cess and support codified under alliance designs. These could include garnering 
Japanese civilian and defense logistics support for an operation or the opening up 
of Japanese civilian airports for use as intermediate staging bases and safe havens 
for noncombatant evacuees. Conversely, the Japanese government might use the 
ACM to ensure that it influences U.S. decision-making and gets its say before the 
United States attempts to take potentially escalatory actions that could lead to 
retaliation against bases in Japan, thereby entrapping Japan in conflict.
Third, the guidelines expanded the domains within which the allies may co-
operate. As part of the desire to prepare to provide seamless responses to security 
threats, the two governments decided to broaden alliance responsibilities beyond 
the air, land, and sea domains, to include space and cyberspace. For the United 
States, space and cyber had been recognized domains for security operations for 
some time, but the same was not true of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF).60 
Hampered in part by budget restraints, the JSDF did not have its first military-use 
satellite in orbit until 2017, and its first cyber unit did not stand up until 2014.61 
The “2015 Guidelines” capitalized on Japan’s unilateral expansion in those do-
mains to incorporate alliance cooperation.
Fourth, the “2015 Guidelines” expanded the reach of the alliance to the whole 
of government. Previous iterations of the guidelines focused on foreign policy 
and defense organizations, but the “2015 Guidelines” recognized the challenges 
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of gray-zone conflict and sought to incorporate law-enforcement and other or-
ganizations that wield nonmilitary instruments of power. While the guidelines 
did not succeed in incorporating an explicit call for cooperation with the Japan 
Coast Guard, National Police Agency, Ministry of Finance, or others, they were 
included under the scope of “relevant agencies.”62 Similarly, the guidelines called 
for cooperation with civilian authorities for the conduct of site surveys necessary 
to prepare for U.S. contingency operations, such as those that may occur on the 
Korean Peninsula.63
How have the guidelines done in managing entrapment and abandonment? 
Since publication of the “2015 Guidelines,” the two governments have employed 
the ACM in response to numerous North Korean provocations, coordinating 
alliance responses and exchanging information on the incidents.64 The U.S. mili-
tary has conducted site surveys at multiple civilian airports in preparation for 
potential contingency operations. Meanwhile, while much of the intra-alliance 
discourse on the Senkakus is classified, U.S. officials have reiterated the security 
guarantee over the islands while supporting development of the Japan Ground 
Self-Defense Force’s amphibious brigade and continuing bilateral training on 
missions specifically tailored to remote-island defense.65 All of this demonstrates 
the effectiveness of the guidelines in updating the alliance for the modern stra-
tegic environment, since they redefined the casus foederis, provided a list of ap-
plicable RMCs, declared mechanisms for managing them, and presented a road 
map for implementation.
The fears of abandonment and entrapment continue to influence alliance rela-
tionships today. Scholarship offers seven key takeaways for academics and prac-
titioners alike. First, alliances tend to deter militarized interstate conflict, which 
decreases the risk of warfare for alliance members but suggests that adversaries 
will compete in ways short of military conflict. Second, the risk of entrapment is 
low, although individual leaders within alliance management may inflate this risk 
in intra-alliance bargaining. Third, alliance designs matter in managing the risks 
of abandonment and entrapment. States carefully craft alliances to mitigate the 
chance of being abandoned or entrapped, and once the security relationship is 
formed they leverage alliance designs to support their desired security outcomes. 
Fourth, those alliance designs include nonmilitary benefits that factor into aban-
donment and entrapment issues. States are concerned with what the fulfillment 
or nonfulfillment of those obligations may mean for their own security objectives. 
Fifth, risk of abandonment increases over time because societies, administrations, 
and expectations change but alliance designs do not—unless the allies deliberately 
take steps to modify them. Sixth, adversaries attempt to undermine alliances, 
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divide the allies, or both, which increases the risk of abandonment. Seventh, allies 
can take steps to reduce the risk of abandonment and entrapment through rene-
gotiation or clarification of alliance designs.
Understanding these takeaways is necessary for determining what posture al-
lies should take in the modern strategic environment. Alliances have worked well 
in deterring armed-attack situations, but adversaries intentionally are avoiding 
the thresholds for military conflict while seeking to change the status quo in their 
favor through gray-zone tactics. Alliance designs that have not been reworked to 
respond to security incidents short of an armed attack require updating. Fortu-
nately, there are examples of allies that have taken the necessary steps to modify 
alliance arrangements for present-day security challenges, including expanding 
the casus foederis beyond armed-attack situations, incorporating new domains 
for cooperation such as space and cyberspace, and focusing on coordinated 
employment of nonmilitary instruments of power. The U.S.-Japan “2015 Guide-
lines” document provides a useful model for other alliances today.
While this article offers useful conclusions for academics and practitioners 
alike, additional research is necessary. First, the conclusions drawn here should 
be applied to case studies in alignments rather than alliances. There has been a 
decline in usage of traditional treaty alliances and a rise in alignments, and initial 
impressions are that abandonment fears will increase as a result, since the resulting 
obligations are not explicit, merely implicit.66 Second, additional research is neces-
sary for examining abandonment and entrapment in multilateral as opposed to 
bilateral alliances. For example, how do those risks influence alliance management 
in NATO compared with the U.S.-Japan alliance? Finally, more research should 
be dedicated to understanding the tools that allies have to mitigate the risks of 
abandonment and entrapment. This article offered one example—the “Guidelines 
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation”—but other institutions and instruments are 
available, demonstrating varying degrees of effectiveness.67
N O T E S
 1. The first use of the terms abandonment and 
entrapment in the context of alliance fears 
was in Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear 
Revolution: International Politics before and 
after Hiroshima (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1981).
 2. Foederology is the study of alliances.
 3. Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, 
“Armed Conflicts, 1946–2013,” Journal of 
Peace Research 51, no. 4 (July 2014), pp. 
541–54. Instruments of power refers to the 
diplomatic, information, military, economic, 
finance, intelligence, and law-enforcement 
(i.e., DIME-FIL) spectrum.
 4. “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation,” 27 April 2015, Ministry of 
Defense (Japan), mod.go.jp/. Subsequent 
references will be to the “2015 Guidelines” 
specifically or the guidelines more generally.
 5. Alexander Lanoszka, “Tangled Up in Rose? 
Theories of Alliance Entrapment and the 
2008 Russo-Georgian War,” Contemporary 
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
 B O S AC K  6 1
Security Policy 39, no. 2 (2018), pp. 234–57; 
Douglas M. Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: 
Reputation and Alliance Formation,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (June 
2008), pp. 426–54; Mark J. C. Crescenzi et 
al., “Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance 
Formation,” International Studies Quarterly 
56, no. 2 (June 2012), pp. 259–74; Michaela 
Mattes, “Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance 
Design,” International Organization 66, no. 4 
(Fall 2012), pp. 679–707.
 6. Thomas S. Wilkins, “‘Alignment,’ Not ‘Alli-
ance’—the Shifting Paradigm of International 
Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual 
Taxonomy of Alignment,” Review of Interna-
tional Studies 38, no. 1 (January 2012), pp. 
53–76.
 7. This may not be a simple case of entrapment, 
but another form of entanglement such as 
chain ganging: an occurrence in which the 
fear that an ally will defect or be defeated 
draws other allies into wars—against their 
broader interests. Dominic Tierney, “Does 
Chain-Ganging Cause the Outbreak of War?,” 
International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (June 
2011), p. 285.
 8. Paul K. Huth, “The Extended Deterrent Value 
of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 34, no. 2 (June 1990), pp. 270–90; 
Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds, 
“Defense Pacts: A Prescription for Peace?,” 
Foreign Policy Analysis 7, no. 1 (January 2011), 
pp. 45–65; Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. 
Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: 
Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended 
Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of 
Political Science 58, no. 4 (October 2014), pp. 
919–35; Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: 
Alliance Restraint in International Politics 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2008); 
Tierney, “Does Chain-Ganging Cause the 
Outbreak of War?”; Songying Fang, Jesse C. 
Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds, “To Concede 
or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military 
Alliances,” International Organization 68, no. 
4 (Fall 2014), pp. 775–809; Glenn H. Snyder, 
“The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” 
World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984), pp. 
461–95; Robert Jervis, “What Do We Want to 
Deter and How Do We Deter It?,” in Turning 
Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy, 
ed. L. Benjamin Ederington and Michael J. 
Mazarr (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), pp. 
122–24; Alastair Smith, “Alliance Formation 
and War,” International Studies Quarterly 39, 
no. 4 (December 1995), pp. 405–25; Brett V. 
Benson, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher 
W. Ramsay, “Inducing Deterrence through 
Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 2 (March 2014), 
pp. 307–35; Neil Narang and Rupal N. Mehta, 
“The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended 
Deterrence: Moral Hazard in a Nuclear Client 
State,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 
1 (January 2019), pp. 218–50; Themnér and 
Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts.”
 9. Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but 
Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies 20, 
no. 3 (August 2011), pp. 352, 355; Lanoszka, 
“Tangled Up in Rose?”; Emma M. Ashford, 
“Hegemonic Blackmail: Entrapment in Civil 
War Intervention,” Canadian Foreign Policy 
Journal 23, no. 3 (July 2017), pp. 218–31; 
Daina Chiba, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett 
Ashley Leeds, “Careful Commitments: 
Democratic States and Alliance Design,” 
Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (October 2015), 
pp. 968–82; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack 
Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: 
Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” 
International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 
1990), pp. 137–68; Tierney, “Does Chain-
Ganging Cause the Outbreak of War?”; Ron-
ald R. Krebs and Jennifer Spindel, “Divided 
Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ over 
Military Intervention,” Security Studies 27, 
no. 4 (October 2018), pp. 575–606; Brad L. 
LeVeck and Neil Narang, “How International 
Reputation Matters: Revisiting Alliance Vio-
lations in Context,” International Interactions 
43, no. 5 (2017), pp. 796–821.
 10. Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom 
Entrap States,” p. 352; Chiba, Johnson, and 
Leeds, “Careful Commitments.”
 11. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance 
Politics”; Jan von der Felsen and H. Chris-
tian Breede, “Friede, Freude, Pancakes? The 
Concept of War and What Is Lost within the 
NATO Alliance,” Canadian Foreign Policy 
Journal 22, no. 2 (2016), pp. 147–62.
 12. Gene Gerzhoy, “Alliance Coercion and 
Nuclear Restraint: How the United States 
Thwarted West Germany’s Nuclear 
Ambitions,” International Security 39, no. 4 
(Spring 2015), pp. 91–129; Jesse C. Johnson, 
17
Bosack: Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 6 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
“The Cost of Security: Foreign Policy 
Concessions and Military Alliances,” Journal 
of Peace Research 52, no. 5 (September 2015), 
pp. 665–79; Pressman, Warring Friends; 
Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom 
Entrap States”; Fang, Johnson, and Leeds, “To 
Concede or to Resist?”
 13. James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: 
An Alternative to the Capability Aggrega-
tion Model of Alliances,” American Journal of 
Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991), 
pp. 904–33.
 14. Tongfi Kim, The Supply Side of Security: A 
Market Theory of Military Alliances (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2016), pp. 35–36; 
Johnson, “The Cost of Security.”
 15. Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom 
Entrap States.”
 16. Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John 
D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in Inter-
national Alliances (New York: Wiley, 1973), 
p. 55; Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, 
“Domestic Sources of Alliances and Align-
ment: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73,” Interna-
tional Organization 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991), 
pp. 369–95; Erik Gartzke and Kristian Skrede 
Gleditsch, “Why Democracies May Actually 
Be Less Reliable Allies,” American Journal of 
Political Science 48, no. 4 (October 2004), pp. 
775–95; Brett Ashley Leeds, Michaela Mattes, 
and Jeremy S. Vogel, “Interests, Institutions, 
and the Reliability of International Commit-
ments,” American Journal of Political Science 
53, no. 2 (April 2009), pp. 461–76; Stephanie 
C. Hofmann and Andrew I. Yeo, “Business as 
Usual: The Role of Norms in Alliance Man-
agement,” European Journal of International 
Relations 21, no. 2 (June 2015), pp. 377–401; 
Tongfi Kim and Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba, “The 
Effect of Age Structure on the Abrogation of 
Military Alliances,” International Interactions 
41, no. 2 (2015), pp. 279–308; Brett Ashley 
Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alli-
ances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?,” 
Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (November 2007), 
pp. 1118–32.
 17. Molly Berkemeier and Matthew Fuhrmann, 
“Reassessing the Fulfillment of Alliance Com-
mitments in War,” Research and Politics 5, no. 
2 (April 2018), pp. 1–5.
 18. Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy 
Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape 
Power Politics,” International Security 35, 
no. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 155–89; Yasuhiro 
Izumikawa, “To Coerce or Reward? 
Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance 
Politics,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (August 
2013), pp. 498–531.
 19. Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Reluctant Stakeholder: 
Why China’s Highly Strategic Brand of Revi-
sionism Is More Challenging Than Washing-
ton Thinks,” MacroPolo, 27 April 2018,  
macropolo.org/; Sugio Takahashi, “Develop-
ment of Gray-Zone Deterrence: Concept 
Building and Lessons from Japan’s Experi-
ence,” Pacific Review 31, no. 6 (2018), pp. 
787–810.
 20. For example, North Korea, China, and Rus-
sia all have active cyber units that engage in 
disinformation campaigns, cyber crime, and 
other illicit behavior that cannot be attrib-
uted directly enough to justify deterrence 
through punishment under international 
law.
 21. For example, see Chinese “debt diplomacy,” 
Chinese island building in the South China 
Sea, Russian disinformation campaigns, and 
North Korean theft of Bitcoin currency.
 22. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The 
Nature and Sources of Liberal International 
Order,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 
2 (April 1999), pp. 179–96.
 23. U.N. Charter ch. VII, “Action with Respect to 
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression.” Emphasis added.
 24. This is the model for every U.S. alliance treaty 
since 1945, including the North Atlantic Trea-
ty, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and 
the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. 
A prominent example of a non-American 
alliance treaty built on this framework is that 
between China and North Korea, of which 
article 2 states, “The Contracting Parties 
undertake jointly to adopt all measures to pre-
vent aggression against either of the Contract-
ing Parties by any state. In the event of one 
of the Contracting Parties being subjected to 
the armed attack by any state or several states 
jointly and thus being involved in a state of 
war, the other Contracting Party shall imme-
diately render military and other assistance by 
all means at its disposal.” Douglas M. Gibler, 
International Military Alliances, 1648–2008 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), p. 423.
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
 B O S AC K  6 3
 25. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (27 June).
 26. Both level of intensity and impetus for 
response are predicated on international legal 
frameworks and precedents for the use of 
instruments of power in response.
 27. For the Japanese law, see Ryōkai oyobi 
Setsuzoku suiiki ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on 
territorial waters and contiguous water area], 
Law No. 210 of 2 May 1977; for UNCLOS, see 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
 28. Charles J. Dunlap Jr. [Maj. Gen., USAF], 
“Lawfare Today: A Perspective,” Yale Journal 
of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (Winter 2008), 
pp. 146–54.
 29. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), 
Case No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2016).
 30. Patrick J. Cullen and Erik Reichborn- 
Kjennerud, Understanding Hybrid Warfare 
(n.p.: Multinational Capability Development 
Campaign Countering Hybrid Warfare Project, 
January 2017), assets.publishing.service.gov 
.uk/.
 31. Michael Aaronson et al., “NATO Countering 
the Hybrid Threat,” Prism 2, no. 4 (2011), p. 
115.
 32. “Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Coopera-
tion,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 
July 2018, nato.int/.
 33. This is especially true if one ascribes to 
Schweller’s argument that alliances are 
formed on the basis of a balance of interests, 
the most basic being interest in the status 
quo vs. revisionism. Randall L. Schweller, 
“Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the 
Revisionist State Back In,” International 
Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72–107.
 34. Wigell reinforces this notion with his 
concept of hybrid interference, which is the 
use of hybrid tactics specifically as part of a 
wedge strategy to divide a target country or 
coalition and weaken its counterbalancing 
potential. Mikael Wigell, “Hybrid Interference 
as a Wedge Strategy: A Theory of External 
Interference in Liberal Democracy,” 
International Affairs 95, no. 2 (March 2019), 
pp. 255–75.
 35. Lanoszka, “Tangled Up in Rose?”; James 
D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them 
Down?,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 
(June 2000), pp. 63–83.
 36. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed. 
(New York: Knopf, 2007), p. 198.
 37. For more on asymmetric alliances, see Mor-
row, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” and Kim, 
The Supply Side of Security.
 38. The 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis 
consisted of a series of escalatory security 
incidents following discovery of North Korean 
nuclear weapons development, North Korea’s 
denial of entry to International Atomic 
Energy Agency inspectors, and the Kim 
regime’s decision to withdraw North Korea 
from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a result, 
the United States placed regional military 
forces on alert for the possible execution 
of military strikes against known nuclear 
weapons facilities. The most notable missile 
launch was the 1998 Taepodong launch, in 
which the missile traveled over Japanese 
territory.
 39. The prior consultation requirement was 
clarified via a formal exchange of notes, hav-
ing following as the subject matter: “Major 
changes in the deployment into Japan of 
United States armed forces, major changes in 
their equipment, and the use of facilities and 
areas in Japan as bases for military combat 
operations to be undertaken from Japan other 
than those conducted under Article V of the 
said Treaty.” Exchange of Notes Incorporating 
Agreed Consultation Formula, Japan-U.S., 19 
January 1960. Article 5 details the obliga-
tion for defense of Japan. Article 4 of the 
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty states: “The 
Parties will consult together from time to time 
regarding the implementation of this Treaty, 
and, at the request of either Party, whenever 
the security of Japan or international peace 
and security in the Far East is threatened.”
 40. North Korea dramatically demonstrated 
its ability to hit Japan with ballistic missiles 
when it launched its Taepodong over 
Japanese territory in 1998. “North Korea Fires 
Missile over Japanese Territory,” New York 
Times, 1 September 1998, nytimes.com/.
 41. In March 2010, ROKS Cheonan, a South 
Korean naval corvette, sank off the west coast 
19
Bosack: Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 6 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
of the peninsula, killing forty-six sailors. A 
formal investigation conducted by the UN 
Command Military Armistice Commission 
concluded that the vessel was sunk by North 
Korean forces, despite the Kim regime’s 
denial of any involvement in the incident. 
In November 2010, North Korea shelled the 
South Korean island of Yeonpyeong-do, kill-
ing four and injuring sixty-eight. Situation in 
the Republic of Korea, Article 5 Report (Int’l 
Crim. Ct. 23 June 2014), icc-cpi.int/. 
 42. In 2002, the allies formally established the 
Bilateral Coordination Mechanism to handle 
coordination in the event of crises or contin-
gencies, including those related to “situations 
in areas surrounding Japan.” Situations in 
areas surrounding Japan (often referred to 
as SIASJs, pronounced “sai-es-jays”) were 
codified officially under Japanese law as those 
that, if allowed to go unchecked, would have 
an important influence on Japanese peace 
and prosperity. If declared, the existence of 
a SIASJ would grant authorities to the JSDF, 
cabinet, and relevant ministries and agencies 
that normally are not available for peacetime 
operations. Following the publication of the 
“2015 Guidelines,” the Japanese government 
updated the SIASJ law to align with alliance 
expectations for support. The archived law is 
entitled Shūhenjitai ni saishite wagakuni no 
heiwa oyobi anzen wo kakuho surutame no 
sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Law concerning 
measures necessary for securing peace and 
security in situations in areas surrounding 
Japan], Law No. 253 of 1999. The updated 
law is entitled Jyūyō eikyō jitai ni saishite 
wagakuni no heiwa oyobi anzen wo kakuho 
surutame no sochi ni kansuru hōritsu [Law 
concerning measures necessary for securing 
peace and security in important influence 
situations], Law No. 60 of 2015.
 43. Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan, “DGL—
BCM—SIASJ Changes Briefv3” (2014), held 
in author’s collection.
 44. This issue was handled in the 1960s via two 
secret agreements known as the “Kishi (or 
Korean) minute” and the “Korea clause.” The 
former came in 1960 as a concession from 
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s government, 
asserting that the U.S. military had the 
administration’s tacit agreement to launch 
immediate military action from Japan in the 
event of a North Korean armed attack. The 
latter was part of the November 1969 joint 
communiqué that, on the basis of a verbal 
affirmation, noted that if the U.S. military was 
required to respond to either a Taiwan or a 
North Korean crisis, the Japanese government 
would say yes in response to U.S. prior 
consultation. However, these arrangements 
never have been renewed, and neither side 
has negotiated a current position on the 
matter. Michael M. Bosack, “The Relationship 
between United Nations Command and 
Japan: 1950–2018,” International Journal of 
Korean Studies 23, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 
2019), pp. 71–105.
 45. House of Councillors of Japan, Dai 186 kai 
kokkai, Yosan iinkai dai 1 go [No. 186 Diet 
Session, Budget Committee No. 1 Session], 15 
July 2014, available from kokkai.ndl.go.jp/.
 46. A status of forces agreement lays out the  
legal provisions covering one or more  
foreign militaries operating within a state’s 
sovereign territory. Provisions include but  
are not limited to taxation, basing, entry  
and exit procedures, criminal jurisdiction, 
and host-nation support.
 47. Prior to reversion, U.S. military forces used 
the Senkaku Islands as bombing ranges.
 48. “Taiwan, Japan Agree on Status Quo in Fish-
ing around Senkakus,” Mainichi Shimbun, 11 
April 2019, mainichi.jp/. See “The Numbers 
of Chinese Government and Other Vessels 
That Entered Japan’s Contiguous Zone or 
Intruded into Territorial Sea Surrounding  
the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs of Japan, 30 April 2019, www.mofa 
.go.jp/.
 49. Michael O’Hanlon offers other wargaming 
situations that would not constitute a clear 
“armed attack” scenario, including using 
maskirovka tactics and feigning the “rescue” 
of Chinese tourists or fishermen supposedly 
forced to make landfall on the islands. 
Michael E. O’Hanlon, The Senkaku Paradox: 
Risking Great Power War over Small Stakes 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
2019).
 50. For example, several CCG vessels have the 
same displacement and armament as naval 
frigates. Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, 
and Henry Holst, “Surging Second Sea Force: 
China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, 
Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and 
20
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
 B O S AC K  6 5
Beyond?,” Naval War College Review 72, no. 2 
(Spring 2019), pp. 11–34.
 51. See Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of 
Japan 2018 (Tokyo: 2018), esp. pt. 1, chap. 2, 
sec. 3, “China,” available at www.mod.go.jp/.
 52. Alagappa explains the relevance of core 
values in unilateral security practice, which 
invariably affects decision-making vis-à-vis 
alliance relationships. Muthiah Alagappa, 
ed., Asian Security Practices: Material and 
Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
Univ. Press, 1998). This is also relevant to 
Morgenthau’s concept in Politics among 
Nations of the “community of interests” 
underwriting alliance relationships.
 53. Every joint statement of the Security 
Consultative Committee since 2000 
either explicitly mentions the “2015 
Guidelines” or details some activity related 
to implementation of roles, missions, and 
capabilities codified within the guidelines. 
See “Japan-U.S. Security Consultative 
Committee,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan, 19 April 2019, www.mofa.go.jp/.
 54. Article 5 reads as follows: “Each Party rec-
ognizes that an armed attack against either 
Party in the territories under the administra-
tion of Japan would be dangerous to its own 
peace and safety and declares that it would 
act to meet the common danger in accor-
dance with its constitutional provisions and 
processes. Any such armed attack and all 
measures taken as a result thereof shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council 
of the United Nations in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. 
Such measures shall be terminated when the 
Security Council has taken the measures nec-
essary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security.”
 55. “2015 Guidelines.”
 56. Such emerging threats include the so-
called jyūyōeikyō jitai (important influence 
situation), which replaced SIASJ and 
includes, among other scenarios, response 
to a Korean Peninsula crisis. The section 
regarding response to an armed attack against 
a country other than Japan expanded the 
casus foederis to include limited exercise 
of collective self-defense in support of the 
United States. Despite the absence of such 
a military obligation under the Mutual 
Security Treaty, the guidelines clearly state 
the conditions under which Japan could 
use military force in support of its U.S. 
ally. Definition of a major natural disaster 
as a security incident warranting alliance 
response represented another change to the 
casus foederis. International activities were 
included within the scope of the alliance 
in the 1997 guidelines, but the “2015 
Guidelines” expanded the RMCs associated 
with this category of cooperation.
 57. The ACM was formally established in 
November 2015 via secretary/minister-level 
affirmation of a bilaterally negotiated imple-
mentation instrument.
 58. Part of this necessity is borne from article 4 
of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty, which 
dictates that the allies will consult “whenever 
the security of Japan or international peace 
and security in the Far East is threatened.”
 59. Given Japanese constitutional limitations, 
the JSDF is prohibited from operating within 
a command-and-control structure in which 
partner militaries have rules on the use of 
military force that are different from its own 
(a concept known as ittaika). As a result, the 
U.S.-Japan alliance operates bilaterally with 
parallel command structures, unlike NATO 
or the U.S.–South Korean alliance. Ministry 
of Defense of Japan, “Basic Policy for the 
Development of New Security Legislation,” 
pt. 2, chap. 1, sec. 3 in Defense of Japan 2014 
(Tokyo: 2014), available at www.mod.go.jp/. 
Michael M. Bosack, “Article 9, Ittaika, and 
Japan’s Liaison Officer Corps,” Japan Times, 
29 January 2020, japantimes.co.jp/.
 60. The U.S. government designated cyberspace 
a domain of combat in its 2004 version of 
the national military strategy. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the 
United States of America: A Strategy for Today; 
A Vision for Tomorrow (Washington, DC: 
2004), available at history.defense.gov/. The 
U.S. Space Command originally was activated 
in 1985. “Pentagon Christens U.S. Space 
Command,” Washington Post, 24 September 
1985, www.washingtonpost.com/.
 61. In adherence to a policy set in 1976, Japanese 
defense spending was capped at 1 percent of 
gross domestic product every year but one 
(1986) until 2019. Matt Williams, “Japan 
Becomes a Military Space Player with Latest 
21
Bosack: Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 6 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Launch,” Universe Today, 25 January 2017, 
www.universetoday.com/; Mizuho Aoki, 
“New SDF Unit Shores Up Thinly Protected 
Cyberborders,” Japan Times, 7 April 2014, 
www.japantimes.co.jp/.
 62. Early versions of the negotiated guidelines 
included language specifically naming Japan’s 
law-enforcement entities, but those were 
struck owing to Japanese domestic political 
constraints. Michael M. Bosack, “Realizing a 
‘Seamless Response’: Incorporating the Japan 
Coast Guard in the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 
Sasakawa USA Forum, no. 13 (15 May 2018), 
spfusa.org/.
 63. “2015 Guidelines.”
 64. Notably, the ACM was employed in response 
to the 2016 North Korean nuclear test, 
coordinating the execution of a “sequenced 
bilateral” show-of-force mission with the 
South Korean government. Ministry of 
Defense of Japan, “Alliance Coordination 
Mechanism (ACM) Video-Conference at 
the Director-General Level,” press release, 10 
September 2016, mod.go.jp/.
 65. It is worth mentioning that the U.S. gov-
ernment’s first formal reassurance on the 
Senkakus came in 2014, after the allies had 
agreed in October 2013 to renegotiate the 
guidelines. “Japan Activates First Marines 
since WWII to Bolster Defenses against 
China,” Reuters, 7 April 2018, www.reuters 
.com/; Brice Cutler [Cpl., USMC], “IRON 
FIST 2019 Strengthens U.S.-Japan Alliance; 
Certifies ARDB,” Marines, 12 February 2019, 
marines.mil/.
 66. Rajan Menon, The End of Alliances (New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007); Wilkins, 
“‘Alignment,’ Not ‘Alliance’”; Zachary Selden, 
Alignment, Alliance, and American Grand 
Strategy (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan 
Press, 2016).
 67. Johnston offers useful insight into institutional 
adaptation within alliances. Seth A. Johnston, 
How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization 
in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2017).
22
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/5
